

HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE CONTROLS ONLY



"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law".

It is to be seen only by U. S. PERSONNEL especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive TALENT-KEYHOLE information: Its security must be maintained in accordance with KEYHOLE and TALENT regulations.

[REDACTED]  
Copy 1 of 7

25X1

25X1A5A1

NOTES ON THE [REDACTED] REPORT TO USIB ON 1 AUGUST 1964

(Unofficial notes of [REDACTED])

25X1

25X1A5A1

1. He started by saying that he would make some general remarks and then call on other Panel members for comments within their special fields.

2. The first and most important point he made was a general attack on paragraph 21 of NIE 11-8-63. He first read the following sentence from the NIE: "In general, we believe that the USSR would have great economic difficulty in pursuing a policy which called for antimissile defenses of major cities, competition with the US in space, and the higher sides of our estimates for long range strike forces which appear below." He then stated that this sentence was incorrect because the Soviets appeared to be carrying out all of these programs.

3. The Panel was impressed with the "scope breadth, and balance" of Soviet military programs "across the board." His view was that programs in all fields were being carried out without any specific completion date contemplated and that "a constant level of effort" was being devoted to military programs. (In retrospect, it appears that Mr. Hyland was talking about research and development although he did not make this clear. He also did not appear to realize that the NIE sentence quoted above was addressed to Soviet military forces.)

4. He stated categorically that numbers of weapons were really not important but their operational characteristics were.

5. He said the quality of the briefings he received were very high, with the exception of those on the hardness of ICBM sites.

Major General John B. Medaris, Special Adviser to ACSI

1. He stated that the primary Soviet objectives are to gain full control of the near-earth space environment and to "blind" the US satellite reconnaissance capability.

25X1

2. He expected to see in the near term the Soviet accomplishment of rendezvous and docking and the establishment of a manned space station. The later establishment of a large manned space station would give them the option of lunar exploration at far less cost than the current US method, i.e., he thought a booster with  $1\frac{1}{2}$  to 2 million pounds of thrust would be sufficient for going to the moon from a space station. Perhaps the SS-10 may be intended to fulfill this mission as well as the mission of delivering a large yield warhead (25 to 50 MT) in an ICBM role.

[REDACTED]

25X1B6H

25X1B6H

3. He stated that the Soviets have an urgent requirement for complete knowledge of our satellite reconnaissance capabilities in order to "blind" us. He feels that the Soviets consider that an anti-satellite capability has a higher priority than an ABM capability at this time. He thought that new radar installations (Hen Houses and Moscow radar) were intended to support an anti-satellite capability.

25X1A5A1

[REDACTED]

1. He stated that the Panel was impressed with the progress made in photographic intelligence collection. Area coverage and quality was considered good.

25X1D3A

[REDACTED]

25X1D3A

2. He felt that the intelligence community should know as much as possible about the Hen House radar and the Moscow Triads, and thus

25X1D2A

[REDACTED]

25X1B6H

[REDACTED]

25X1D2A

[REDACTED]

25X1D2A

[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1D6B

25X1D6B

Dr. John S. Foster, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory

1. ABM and anti-satellite.

2. Hard Silos.

He does not believe that the briefing presented an adequate picture of all the data that are available. Better pictures of

25X1B1A

3. Nuclear Weapons Delivery

There is little evidence of lay-down capability of Soviet long-range bombers, i.e., low-level delivery of warheads. The alternative to this approach is a stand-off capability, i.e., air-to-surface missiles.

4. Nuclear Warheads

a. He feels that Soviets may use multiple warheads, which are effective against ABM systems. However, he feels, most important, that, if the Soviets can guide these individual

warheads to different targets, effectiveness of each ICBM booster can be increased several times.



25X1

5. Nuclear Production

He stated that not only is there no information on stoppage of production but there is direct evidence of increasing capacity to produce. He thinks it indicates need for a large number of warheads for many purposes, e.g., multiple warheads.

6. General Observation

He feels that it is a good thing to have a "two party system" in intelligence, i.e., more than one agency working on the same high priority problem. However, he feels that it is also important to review our post estimates in the light of what we know now to determine the best sources for future estimates.

Rear Admiral Levering Smith, Special Projects Office, Bureau of Naval Weapons

1. He was struck by the fact that the Soviets are pursuing a strong balanced program rather than concentrating their whole effort on one item. He believes the Soviet program to be a "carefully planned long term program in each area".

2. He finds no reason to disagree with estimates of current force strengths, but, despite some indication of slackening at present, he expects a continuation of growth in the future. (Admiral Smith did not make himself clear as to what forces he was talking about, i.e., whether just submarine or all types of weapons.)

3. He feels that the sub-launched cruise missile can be used against cities. He believes Soviets have the capabilities for longer range ballistic missiles for submarines although there is no evidence of Soviets extending their range. He suggests that Soviet navigation and atmospheric control on submarines may be a limitation.

4. He feels the Soviets may be 10 to 15 years behind US capability to control noise on nuclear subs.

5. He supports the position that current developments in ballistic-missile submarines imply that Soviets are retro-fitting their fleet for a better missile. He expects to see Soviets testing sub-launched ballistic missiles to longer ranges and with greater accuracy.

6. He feels that the Leningrad complex may be an anti-Polaris system and the Hen House a "nation-wide" ABM system. He recommends a complete "re-look" at the Soviet ABM picture and "sees" a well-planned long-range program for ABM.

25X1A5A1

1. He stated that he is impressed by the Soviets' "increased capability to attack" the US which he feels is growing "at an accelerated rate". The only exception seems to him to be the ballistic missile submarine program.

2. He believes the Soviets are "on the verge of solid missiles" for submarines and other purposes.

3. Although he sees no change in the Soviet aircraft program over the last year, he feels there is no conclusive evidence that Soviets are or are not producing a new heavy bomber.

4. He stated that although we know Soviets are experimenting with rocket aircraft in the Mach 3 region, we don't know whether it's an X-15 type or not.

5. With respect to camouflage, he said it's hard to believe that the Soviets would not have a strong program if they knew the high quality of our KH photography.

6. After noting a large number of developments, he stated that the Soviets had "a balanced program in many areas".

25X1A5A1

1. He stated that he was most impressed with the scope, depth, pace, and balance of Soviet activities and now early commitment to deployment of new weapons, e.g., Hen Houses.

2. He sees no "slackening of pace," e.g., two new ICBMs, 2 new SAMs and new fighters.
3. He pointed out the differences between "massive R&D programs for the future" versus "delivery of end items to the field."
4. He said that he is afraid US tends to under-estimate the value of secrecy to the Soviets. Because he thinks it is most important, he is concerned about their achieving an anti-satellite capability.
5. He believes the intelligence community tends too much to talk in "mutually exclusive choices," e.g., either a wide-spread ABM program or none at all.
6. He believes that he sees in Soviet programing a "level-of-effort approach to allocation of resources" without any "specific dates" for accomplishing tasks.
7. He thinks US ought to be alert to any indication of Soviets operating their missile subs from bases outside the USSR, e.g., Cuba.

Lt. General Raymond A. Davis, Air Force Systems Command

1. He believes US estimates over-emphasize quantitative aspects, although he finds no fault with current methods related to estimating quantities.
2. However, he found considerable fault with technical approach -- too much emphasis on characteristics of boosters and not enough on operational aspects, e.g., command and control, guidance, warheads and targetting.
3. He stated: "The indicated slow-down in site construction is not significant at all because qualitative aspects are more important".
4. He said he did not see any evidence of "stopping of production and deployment of SS-7." In fact, he feels "new deployment may be for SS-7" and "change in pace of site construction may simply be an indication of a new deployment concept." He implied that this means Soviets are putting more emphasis on quality of force.
5. He thinks we should "look for road and rail-mobile ICBM."

6. He believes that information on solid production and test facilities indicates Soviet intention to go ahead.

7. With respect to O.B., he again stated that he thinks we have not given enough emphasis to refire capability of Soviet soft sites. He feels that refire capability should be included in comparisons of US and Soviet O.B.

8. He thinks that improving resolution of KH is a "matter of extreme urgency."

25X1A5A1



1. He reviewed the successes of the [redacted] Panel's predictions since 1954, e.g., [redacted] sub-launched missile threat. The Panel predicted that U-2 would be cut off; now he feels that KH is in same situation.

25X1A5A1

25X1B1A

2. He warned the intelligence community of the "intelligence lag" and stated: "Nothing we (the Panel) predicted has not shown up."

3. He warned the intelligence community of the serious possibility of the Soviets cutting off our information sources by camouflage and communications security.

Major General John B. Medaris, ACSI, Special Adviser

1. He pointed up "errors in previous GMAIC estimates" (not specific). He feels that the Soviets have achieved a balance between "strategic defense and counter-offense," although there has been "some decrease in hardware."

#### GENERAL DISCUSSION WITH BOARD MEMBERS

The following points were made:

1. The quality of the briefing on silo-hardness was about 1 to 10 percent of that of all other briefings. General Davis made the point that intelligence estimating of hardness can be nothing but an academic exercise without some empirical evidence on the hardness of our own sites.



25X1A5A1

2. In reply to a question on economics by Mr. Cline, [ ] said that Soviets seem to be carrying out all the programs quoted in spite of their economic difficulties. ([ ] seemed to be talking about R&D and Cline was talking about total military programs.)

25X1A5A1

25X1A5A1

3. [ ] said that BEAR and even BISON could be convertible to nuclear powered aircraft as long-endurance stand-off bombers.

25X1A5A1

4. [ ] said that aircraft plants are expanding and it's "hard to believe they are there just for decoration."

25X1D0C

5. The Army member of USIB put in a pitch for more [ ]

25X1D0C

25X1A5A1

6. In reply to [ ] question about uncertainty about the direction of Soviet military programs, [ ] said that the "Panel was far less uncertain about Soviet programs than last year, and now facts show that Soviets have a very sound program."

25X1A5A1

7. In reply to a question by [ ] said the problem of anti-satellite kill was as follows:

25X1A5A1

25X1B0A

Task

Difficulty Index

--

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**